2. Hybrid Interactions. Human Rights and Development in Cultural Perspective

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“Human rights increasingly form part of a wider network of perspectives which are shared and exchanged between the North and South, centers and peripheries, in multiple, creative and sometimes conflict-ridden ways. Human rights have become ‘universalized’ as values subject to interpretation, negotiation, and accommodation. They have become ‘culture’.”

Ann-Belinda S. Preis, 1996

“The question of empowerment is central to both culture and development. It decides who has the means of imposing on a society the view of what constitutes culture and development.”

Aung San Suu Kyi, 1995

A recent conference, held in November 1998 in Istanbul by a group of scholars, lawyers, development specialists and human rights activists, focused on “how compatible a universal normative approach to development is with respect to the right of peoples and communities to self-determination as well as with respect to organisations’ autonomy” (Donders, 1999:1). We are obviously faced here with a complex matter. Therefore, this chapter attempts to provide an introductory overview of recent thoughts on human
rights, development and culture. We realise, however, that this complexity cannot be dealt with exhaustively within the scope of a single chapter.

Human rights, development and culture are continuously evolving concepts. For instance, the civil and political rights are often referred to as the first generation of human rights. A second generation of rights emerged at the turn of the century, emphasizing the economic, social and cultural rights of people. Among others, the right to work, education and cultural participation belong to this set of rights. Recently, the demand for collective, solidarity or third generation rights has been voiced by the South as the result of anti-colonial revolutions. These new rights emphasize national self-determination and non-discrimination.

Development and culture too are dynamic concepts. A complete historical survey, however, would carry us too far. In this chapter, we will limit ourselves to a revision of three conventional ‘dichotomies’: (a) tradition versus modernity, (b) universalism versus relativism, and (c) individualism versus collectivism.

Two basic assumptions are made. First, human rights, development and culture are interdependent phenomena, which should not be separated in practice. Second, individuals are not only objects of human rights or development, but active agents, participating in, and constituting these phenomena through their interactions with other individuals and institutions.

**Tradition and Modernity**

For a long time, cultures were seen as homogeneous and bounded entities. This view, perhaps epitomized in the description of
cultures as a list of traits, led to an instrumental and mechanical approach vis-à-vis human rights and development. If cultural traits were incompatible with human rights or modern ideas about development, then culture was seen as an obstacle. If the traits were compatible, then culture could be used as a surplus to development.

This chapter proposes a more integrated approach that views culture as a constructive and creative force which encompasses both development and human rights. The underlying idea is that cultures are not homogeneous and bounded entities, but rather dynamic, heterogeneous and open-ended. Some level of cultural coherence must always exist, but this has often been overstated. Deviance, inconsistency, contradiction and disagreement are parts of any culture. They move cultures forward from within, while intercultural contact moves cultures from without.

Apart from economic and political mechanisms, two basic human principles seem at work. On the one hand, people have an inward tendency to associate or identify with a specific culture or subculture (probably as a result of socialization processes). On the other hand, people tend to look to other cultures in order to establish alliances as well as to reinforce differences. In today’s globalized context, intercultural contact has become particularly important (Servaes, 1989, 1999).

Modernization has introduced human rights and the conventional Western concept of development (as a linear, mainly economic, process) nearly everywhere. Colonialism and globalization are major forces that have made a large number of cultures ‘creole’ or ‘hybrid’. In hybrid contexts, simple models such as traditional versus modern or Western versus non-Western are no longer valid. Western views on development and human rights often remain
caught in these dichotomies. But many cultures now overlap and blend into each other as never before due to new modes of communication, trade and transport.

In the contemporary world, cultures are not isolated. They interact and influence each other. The intercultural dynamics is set in motion by contemporary processes of globalization, which lead, not without tension, to the emergence, consolidation or reformulation of specific cultural and ethical values common to the various cultural areas. Any culture in relation and comparison with other cultures may find its own idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, its strong and its weak points.

The assumption has been made that as societies develop, they will loose their separate identities and cultural differences and tend to converge towards one common type of society. This is considered to be a result of industrialization and urbanization, which are identified as the main causes of this historical movement from diversity towards conformity, towards one global village. This global village is characterized by a secular culture and decline of religion, considerable geographic and social mobility, the predominance of the nuclear family, a high division of labor, with growing levels of formal education, economies based on industry, nowadays driven by the so-called ‘knowledge’ or e-economy, etc. However, many studies contradict these assumptions.

In the case of Thailand, for instance, Suntaree Komin (1988, 1991) found that certain so-called ‘traditional’ values and ‘superstitious’ behaviors like ‘fortune-telling’ and ‘lucky numbers’ are practiced more among Bangkokians than among farmers. No difference was observed in terms of educational level. “This casts some doubt on the theory that postulates a negative correlation between education and supernatural belief and behaviour. However, it is a
dominant value behaviour characteristic of the Thai” (Komin, 1988:171).

Therefore, the global village concept reflects an abstract and idealized image of a fully modern society. Several authors have come to the conclusion that modernization does not necessarily change cultural values. Modernization and indigenous culture can walk parallel, not simply convergent, paths. (e.g. Barbero, 1993; Barker, 2000; Hannerz, 1996; Howard, 1993; Miller, 1995; Servaes & Lie, 1997; Tomlinson, 1997, and; Werbner & Modood, 1997).

The way Islamic law and human rights discourses have met in recent years is a good example of how hybridization really works. In Afghanistan, women defend their right to education and health care by drawing on Western discourses about human rights. At the same time, however, many of them insist on being faithful to Muslim traditions at home (Ignatieff, 1998). Elsewhere, many young Islamic women insist on wearing veils because it makes them less vulnerable to reproaches of Westernization and allows them to go out for work or study (Postel-Coster, 1994). They are not necessarily on their way to a complete assimilation of Western ideas.

The norms, worldviews, institutions and behavioral patterns that they face –and others in other cultures– are not simply given, but construed. Geertz (1973) and others have shown that cultures are symbolic constructions created within social contexts. Foucault (e.g. 1980) pointed out that power is at play here. Different cultural discourses are in competition with each other at various levels.
The debate in India about the practice of sati is a good example. Sati, originally the Sanskrit word for ‘virtuous woman’, is the practice whereby women burn themselves on their husband’s funeral pyre. Sati was abolished by the British Raj in 1829 after numerous cases had been recorded, particularly in the state of Bengal. Lati Mani (1987), who analyzed the debate preceding this decision, shows that sati, as a cultural practice, was interpreted in three different ways by three different groups. She distinguishes between (1) the British colonial discourse, (2) a conservative indigenous discourse, and (3) a progressive indigenous discourse. Mani demonstrates how each position represented a particular construction of sati. Each construction was based on different parts of Brahman scriptures and ignored particular Hindu customs, thus creating an illusionary sense of coherence. The point here is that women were used as a “site on which tradition is debated and reformulated” (Mani, 1987:153), while they themselves were completely absent from the debate. In the eighties, a number of cases of sati in the North of India brought the old debate back. Feminists pointed out that sati was now encouraged by some for economic reasons: to acquire the widow’s dowry and to gain profit by turning it into a tourist attraction (Narayan, 1997). The example shows how a single cultural practice can be used for different purposes and can have different meanings for different people across time.

There are numerous other examples. Many discourses constructed by the tourism industry, governments, elites and Western activists alike –for moral, idealistic, commercial or other reasons– reduce people to uni-dimensional cardboard figures. If these people belong to minorities, whose voice is suppressed, they have a hard
time resisting these constructions. The rights of individuals have often been violated that way. For instance:

“It is a least ironic to see largely Westernized elites warning against the values and practices they have adopted. At their best, such arguments tend to be dangerously paternalistic. For example, “villagization”, which was supposed to reflect traditional African conceptions, was accomplished in Tanzania only by force, against the vocal and occasionally even violent opposition of much of the population” (Donnelly, 1989:119).

The antidote to such harmful views begins with a critical look at one’s own cultural constructions and at conventional views of ‘us’ and ‘them’:

“What is needed is a willingness to interrogate, politically and historically, the apparent “given” of a world in the first place divided into "ourselves" and "others". A first step on this road is to move beyond naturalized conceptions of spatialized “cultures” and to explore instead a production of difference within common, shared, and connected spaces” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997:45).

We first of all have to come to grips with our past. Edward Said’s (1985) captivating overview of the way in which Asian societies and philosophies throughout the ages were perceived by the West starts from the thesis: "That the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian
supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures” (Said, 1985:122). Therefore, academics and the people they study “construct stylized images of the occident and orient in the context of complex social, political, and economic conflicts and relationships. ... these stylized images are not inert products. Rather, they have social, political, and economic uses of their own, for they shape people’s perceptions, justify policies, and so influence people’s actions” (Carrier, 1995:11).

Those participating in a culture are often not aware of the discourses surrounding them, of how they have been constructed, and of how these discourses operate within a power structure. This relates to the difference between participants and observers. Observers can take a critical distance from their own cultural practices. This need not imply that they have to become outsiders. They can remain participants in their own culture, but will be more aware of what is happening around them, and more capable of determining their own path to development. Harmful cultural practices, such as female circumcision, can probably only be countered successfully by turning participants into observers. Note that “the increase of this kind of social reflexivity and the growth of criticism which allows members of a society and culture to challenge these practices in the name of some normative standards is one of the sociological constants of the transition from tradition to modernity. Modern societies allow their members to be at once observers of and participants in their normative orders” (Benhabib, 1996).
Universality and Relativism

Human rights emerged in the West when the modern state and capitalist economy started to develop. They represent a particular vision on human needs and human potential, based on early ‘natural rights’ and later on the ‘rights of man’ which reflected the rationalism, humanism and individualism of the European Enlightenment. The so-called first generation of rights, reflected in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, can be directly related to a Western bourgeoisie liberating itself from feudal and aristocratic powers. In the nineteenth century, Western socialist thinkers inspired a second generation, reflected in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (e.g. Galtung, 1994, Donnelly, 1989). Given these roots, human rights have always been under attack from cultural relativists. Relativists see the Universal Declaration and the Covenants as Western, ethnocentric lists of rights and freedoms, with limited value for the Majority World.

The debate between relativists and universalists, largely a philosophical and ethical issue, continues till today. East-Asian countries, which did not contribute significantly to the Universal Declaration, currently take what is probably the most critical view on human rights. The introduction of Asian Values has been one of the most important issues fueling the universalist-relativist debate in recent years. Asian Values are put forward as a cultural alternative to human rights. They emphasize tolerance, harmony, consensus, collective rights and the right to development. However, Asian Values seem to serve other considerations. It should not come as a surprise that these are mainly economic and political, since the Asian Values critique largely comes from government officials. This critique should not lead, however, to a
complete rejection of the concept of Asian Values, or worse imply that Asian people have no values. As Tommy Koh (1999), the executive director of the Asia-Europe Foundation, explains

“Some of East Asia’s political leaders have given Asian values a bad name by seeking to justify their abuses of power and the inequities of their societies in the name of Asian values. For example, corruption, collusion and nepotism should be condemned by all Asians. They have nothing to do with Asian values. To put it more accurately, they have everything to do with bad Asian values but nothing with good Asian values. This leads me to my point that it is essential to distinguish between good Asian values and bad Asian values. Not all Asian values are good values just as not all Western values are good values. There are good Asian values and bad Asian values, just as there are good Western values and bad Western values” (Koh, 1999:10).

Various attempts are made to reconcile universalism and cultural relativism. If the radical positions of either side are conceptualized as two extremes of a single continuum, then intermediate positions can be found somewhere in between.

Cultural relativism is based on the empirical fact of cultural and historical variability. In its most radical form, cultural relativism opposes all absolutes, considers cultures to be unique and therefore to be the only valid source of values, rights and duties. This position is no longer held by many. According to Janusz Symonides (2000), director of the Human Rights Division at UNESCO, the results of the Vienna Conference confirm that this kind of cultural relativism is in retreat on many fronts. In more moderate forms, cultural relativism remains a valuable correction of the seemingly natural tendency towards ethnocentrism, evaluating one’s culture as superior to others, or taking one’s own values for universal values. Moderate relativism seems compatible with moderate universalism, but not with radical universalism.
Radical universalists deny the historical and cultural specificity of human rights. They claim that human rights are grounded in human nature and that we are all alike. Thus, human rights are moral rights of the highest order, applicable to all at all times. Universalist theories state that human rights are:

“...held by all human beings, irrespective of any rights or duties one may or may not have as citizens, members of families, workers, or parts of any public or private organization or association... If all human beings have them simply because they are human, human rights are held equally by all. And because being human cannot be renounced, lost or forfeited, human rights are inalienable” (Donnelly, 1993:19).

In its most extreme form, universalism can easily lead to imperialism. In more moderate forms, however, it emphasizes a global ethics of people “being bound and motivated by shared commitments” (Peres de Cuéllar, 1995:34) who draw on a variety of cultural resources. This position comes close to moderate relativism.

Radical relativism, which excludes this possibility, is hard to except today, if not from a moral or philosophical perspective, then certainly for pragmatic and functional reasons. There is a nearly worldwide consensus on many of the values that the Universal Declaration wants to protect. Almost all states have adopted the declaration –at least rhetorically– thus giving its rights in practice a substantial and nearly universal basis. Many countries have used them in anti-colonial struggles. The Western origin of human rights does not mean that they are irrelevant elsewhere or cannot have universal value. It does not imply that Westernization is needed to
realize human rights, or that the West is at some advanced stage, or has some universal moral authority.

Although the particular notion of human rights may be said to be Western in origin, basic human needs and various concepts of human dignity around the world can serve as a valuable basis for defending and promoting human rights (for a discussion on needs and rights, see Galtung, 1994). But we do need to acknowledge that ‘rights’ as instruments for development are an alien concept to many cultures. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is often unknown and perceived as highly abstract. According to Bell, translating human rights into local cultural contexts has five important advantages. First, it leads to long term commitments. Second, it helps to find the social groups that are most capable of bringing about social and political changes. Third, human rights are easier to justify. For instance, “if it can be demonstrated that according to traditional Confucian conceptions of political rule governments have an obligation to alleviate suffering and avoid cruelty, this may help to persuade self-identified ‘Confucian’ rulers to avoid committing torture” (Bell, 1996:655). Fourth, it helps activists to find the right attitude. Finally, it increases sensitivity to local mechanisms appropriate for the protection of human rights.

The concern to make human rights more applicable across different cultures has led to such notions as ‘critical universalism’, ‘inclusive universalism’ and ‘weak cultural relativism’. Theories based on these concepts accept universals at a general level, but simultaneously recognize the need for cultural accommodation. Cultural diversity is seen as a positive factor contributing to the universality of human rights. For some scholars this implies a transformation of the system itself, for others cultural
accommodation should mainly be seen in terms of a flexibility of the current standards.

Donnelly, who coined the term weak cultural relativism, distinguishes between three levels of cultural variation: variation in (1) the substance of the list of human rights, (2) the interpretation of individual rights, and (3) the form in which rights are implemented. For Donnelly, the three concepts represent hierarchical levels. His proposal allows for variations primarily at the lowest level of the form. For instance, whether the right to equal protection of the laws requires free legal assistance is a formal matter about which no universal claims can be made (particularly in developing countries it is often a matter of available resources). Cultural variations in form, however, are limited by the levels of interpretation and substance. At the level of interpretation, Donnelly accepts that “culture provides one plausible and defensible mechanism for selecting interpretations” but adds that “there are strong limits on the acceptable range of variation”:

“...The meaning of the “right to political participation,” for example, is controversial, but the range of controversy is limited by the substance of the concept: an election in which a people were allowed to choose an absolute dictator for life (“one man, one vote, once,” as a West African quip put it) is simply an indefensible interpretation” (Donnelly, 1989:117).

Substantive differences lead to changes to the list itself. According to Donnelly, these should only rarely be made. Essentially, there are no reasons not to allow changes to the list of human rights. Since human rights address needs and these needs may vary across time and culture, new human rights may be desirable and
improve the human rights system. There is little to be gained, however, by introducing new rights that remain insignificant at the operational level. In practice, a proliferation of rights may ultimately reduce the value and legitimacy of the human rights discourse.

A truly cross-cultural approach should not only be concerned with the content of rights, but also focus on the construction. Galtung notes that human rights are also Western in their construction. Among others, he points to “the ultimate, universal normative emission in one sender (UNGA), and the delicate balance between enacting rights and cashing in on duties in one receiver only (the state)” (Galtung, 1994:19). Galtung suggests “not to let the state off the hook of accountability, but to extend accountability to other world actors” such as international organizations and corporations, and “to spin a dense normative web of norms by and large pointing in the same (basic human needs) direction, dispersing both authority and credit” (Galtung, 1994:20).

This has become a very important issue since states are rapidly loosing power due to globalization. Multinational corporations increasingly control the economic and everyday life of an individual, but are hardly accountable. They can easily turn their back on human rights. NGO’s can pressure these groups to implement human right standards. This is not an easy thing to do as economists and other professionals in these organizations, tend to separate human rights and economic considerations. “That approach is very deeply rooted not only in the institutional mythology of most, if not all, of the international agencies, but is also strongly reinforced by the philosophical underpinnings of many economic theories and by the methodological approaches used by the great majority of economists” (Alston, 1988:18). This critique
has also been voiced by Amartya Sen. The problem can be countered by bringing together economists, lawyers and cultural specialists in multidisciplinary teams.

**Individualism and Collectivism**

A discussion on culture inevitably leads to the traditional debate on individualism and collectivism. The premise is well known: While the Western cultural position is said to be based on “the sacredness of the individual body, and spirit of the individual” (Galtung, 1994:15), non-Western societies are supposed to emphasize the loyalties and responsibilities towards the community. Many scholars agree with Kagitçibasi who suggests that there is “an individualistic ethos in the Western world” while “the majority of humankind share at least some aspects of collectivism” (1997:4, 5).

In recent years, collectivism has been put forward as one of the Asian Values. The general assumption is that Asian societies tend to favor the interests of the community, while the West emphasizes the individual. This relativist position was reflected in the Bangkok Declaration of April 1993, adopted at the Asian regional preparatory meeting for the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The Vienna Declaration, however, adopted by consensus by the World Conference, confirmed the universality of human rights and rejected the notion of cultural relativism.

The individualism-collectivism dichotomy can be linked to another set of presumed ‘opposites’: first versus second generation rights. The separation of these two types of rights – in a nutshell, food versus freedom– has been the cause of many heated debates, first between the East and the West, now between the South and the North. Liberal-capitalist ideologies traditionally emphasized civil
and political rights, while Marxist thinking tended to focus on second-generation rights. The current insistence on free elections by Western donor countries and the introduction of Asian Values has revived the debate. Western countries are criticized for giving priority to civil and political rights over social, economic and cultural rights. Asian countries in particular have argued that the West now uses civil and political rights to cut aid and undermine development. But Asian governments are said to contest universal human rights “as a bargaining tool vis a vis the West” and “to pursue globalization without internally democratising their societies” (Ravindran, 1998:54).

African nations have emphasized collectivism too. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights includes collective rights and points towards the duties of individuals towards the community (Ama Ankumah, 1992). But the demand from many non-Western countries for universal solidarity rights has not fared well so far. The demand for these rights emerged through anti-colonialist revolutions and is concerned with self-determination and non-discrimination. Solidarity rights pertain primarily to certain collective concerns, such as peace, culture, development and ecological balance. So far, with the exception of the right of peoples to self-determination, the International Bill of Human Rights includes only individual rights.

There are two important reasons why, apart from the right to self-determination, no collective rights have been adopted at the international level. First, states fear that giving rights to groups may foster secessionist movements (this is also the reason why they limit self-determination). In this age of globalization, where states are loosing power to higher levels already, groups with collective rights within their borders might weaken their strengths
even more. Second, group rights are a potential threat to current human rights. Collective freedoms may easily be claimed against, or over, individuals. It is a very serious problem:

“Appeals to the rights of the people collectively are most often used by oppressive, paternalistic regimes to ignore or repress the desires, or to deny the rights of, real, concrete people. The rhetoric of the rights of peoples or the masses too often seems to have little purpose other than to justify the denial of most specific (human and other) rights of most people. The dangers of political abuse are especially strong when the collective body held to possess these third generation human rights is the state” (Donnelly, 1989:145-146)

The Forum for Human Rights and Development, a NGO network based in Bangkok, defends a more grassroots position. They argue that supporting community rights against individual rights is in practice used against Asian communities by denying them their rights.

Nevertheless, we need to take the demands for collective rights seriously. Concerns, such as peace, culture, development and a healthy environment are important enough. Many countries in the world have minority groups that are seriously threatened. Due to globalization, an increasing number of immigrant groups are demanding the right to freely express their cultural particularities within nations dominated by another culture (Lukes, 1993). One might argue that most of their demands are already covered by existing individual human rights, which is true to some extent. But not always. For instance, the individual right to education does not give a group the right to institutionalize its own educational system. In addition, collective rights might help to correct structural injustices. As Tomasevski points out:
“Access to remedy for human rights violations is still - and likely to remain so - exclusively individualistic: remedies can be sought by the individuals whose individual rights have been (allegedly) violated. This is obviously insufficient to challenge structural and policy problems in development” (Tomasevski, 1993:191).

Ultimately, the question is whether rights of a group can be human rights (since groups are not human, but a collection of human beings), and whether they can be compatible with existing human rights. Jones (1999) proposes a distinction between ‘collective groups’ and ‘corporate groups’. A collective group has no moral standing of its own. The attribution of a right to the group is motivated only by the separate but identical interest of the individuals which form the group. A corporate group is a single, integral entity with a moral standing of its own. Jones argues that corporate group rights cannot be accepted as human rights because the moral unit is a group and not a human being. Nations or ‘peoples’ therefore cannot have human rights. Groups based on a collective conception, however, might enjoy human rights because these rights can be traced back to individuals. These rights of the collective group cannot write:

“...individuals out of the moral calculation. If we adopt the collective theory, the claims of the few may have to yield to those of the many, but at least the claims of the few will be heard and counted. (...) Thus, morally, there is no group that has an existence independently of, and that can hold rights against, its own members. There are only individuals who hold rights jointly, and, by common consent, right holders cannot hold rights against themselves. Rights held by individuals jointly, like those held individually, must be rights directed ‘outward’ at other individuals or groups of individuals rather
than ‘inward’ to the right holders themselves” (Jones, 1999:93-94).

Jones’ proposal is largely to see groups and individuals not in opposition to each other, but rather as complementary. Lukes (1993) agrees:

“To defend human rights is to protect individuals from utilitarian sacrifices, communitarian impositions, and from injury, degradation, and arbitrariness, but doing so cannot be viewed independently of economic, legal, political, and cultural conditions and may well involve the protection and even fostering of collective goods... For to defend human rights is not merely to protect individuals. It is also to protect the activities and relations that make their lifes more valuable, activities and relations that cannot be conceived reductively as merely individual goods” (Lukes, 1993:30).

It is a fact that we are all individuals within groups, and that many groups need protection because they are seriously threatened. Whether solidarity rights are really needed, remains to be seen. At the conference in Istanbul on human rights (Donders, 1999) most participants questioned the inclusion of collective rights into the human rights canon. Galtung (1994) looks at the future from an historical perspective:

“In the Western countries human rights have generally first been articulated by civil society, and the state has received the norms only when they can be seen as being sent from above, and usually without any enthusiasm. The civil-political rights were promoted by powerful individuals and civil groups from the emerging bourgeoisie who then became majorities in the national assemblies, transforming monarchies into presidential systems or constitutional monarchies. The economic-social-cultural rights were promoted by working-
class parties before the ruling classes could accept them from a national assembly. In the same vein the most articulate and meaningful civil society organizations today are probably in the fields of development, environment, and peace, promoting norms about goals and processes that sooner or later will be accepted by the state system” (Galtung, 1996:150).

Conclusion

Some of the issues discussed above, it is hoped, can help to establish a cautious but more effective approach in the field of human rights and development. Five major issues are thought to be essential to any human rights and development policy. It is suggested that:

1. Cultures are increasingly hybrid. This forces us to deal with conventional dichotomies, such as traditional versus modern, in a more creative –and hopefully more productive– way.

2. Culture is a multidimensional discourse with a power structure. To understand oppressive discourses, people need to become observers of their own culture. Observation leads to more knowledgeable participation.

3. Human rights should be translated into local cultural contexts. This is not in opposition with universality, provided one accepts a moderate universalism.

4. There is little to support a division of rights. Limited resources and cultural particularities require choices to be made, but these should ideally be made at the level of the form or interpretation of a right, not by cutting rights from the list.

5. There are a number of reasons not to support collective human rights. At least at the level of a corporate group, collective rights are a potential threat to existing human rights.
References


